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More on the great Bush intel flip-flop
September 8, 2004 1:05 PM
By Bradford Plumer, MoJo Blog
Why did George Bush flip-flop on the National Intelligence Director? It's worth diving into the intelligence reform proposals in a little more detail here. From the looks of things, Bush was basically constrained by his original proposal. On August 2nd, the president announced a set of recommendations that included, most prominently, the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) -- something that the 9/11 Commission also proposed. (The NCTC is modeled on the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which was created in 2003 and reports to the director of the CIA.)
Despite all the ruckus over the National intelligence Director, the NCTCs are probably the most important and radical part of the reform effort. Under this system, intelligence would be organized more like the military -- separating operations side of intelligence from analysis and planning. Agencies like the CIA, DIA, and NSA would train and equip agents, as well as collect intelligence in the field. Those agencies (CIA, DIA, NSA, etc.) would then loan analysts to the NCTC to work together, look at terrorism-related information from a wide variety of sources and make recommendations for action. Finally, the agencies themselves would carry out the needed defensive operations, under the guidance of the NCTCs. To use a military analogy, you can think of the agencies as the armed forces, and the NCTCs as the Central Commands.
There are problems with this approach, and it's far from obvious that this is the correct way to go about things. But the important thing is that you simply can't create these National Counterterrorism Centers without a strong national intelligence director. Agencies like the CIA and DIA are going to be loath to send their best analysts away, so you need a director who could plausibly enforce that coordination. As it stands now, the NCTC's predecessor -- the Terrorist Threat Integration Center -- has had trouble working with Homeland Security and other domestic intelligence sources, mainly because it reports only to the director of the CIA.
Now, you can argue that no director will be able to coordinate all these various agencies, but in that case you might as well scrap the idea altogether. The real question, then, is why Bush thought it was even possible to have a figurehead national intelligence director in the first place.
- Bradford Plumer
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
This article has been made possible by the Foundation for National Progress, the Investigative Fund of Mother Jones
© 2004 The Foundation for National Progress
September 8, 2004 1:05 PM
By Bradford Plumer, MoJo Blog
Why did George Bush flip-flop on the National Intelligence Director? It's worth diving into the intelligence reform proposals in a little more detail here. From the looks of things, Bush was basically constrained by his original proposal. On August 2nd, the president announced a set of recommendations that included, most prominently, the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) -- something that the 9/11 Commission also proposed. (The NCTC is modeled on the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which was created in 2003 and reports to the director of the CIA.)
Despite all the ruckus over the National intelligence Director, the NCTCs are probably the most important and radical part of the reform effort. Under this system, intelligence would be organized more like the military -- separating operations side of intelligence from analysis and planning. Agencies like the CIA, DIA, and NSA would train and equip agents, as well as collect intelligence in the field. Those agencies (CIA, DIA, NSA, etc.) would then loan analysts to the NCTC to work together, look at terrorism-related information from a wide variety of sources and make recommendations for action. Finally, the agencies themselves would carry out the needed defensive operations, under the guidance of the NCTCs. To use a military analogy, you can think of the agencies as the armed forces, and the NCTCs as the Central Commands.
There are problems with this approach, and it's far from obvious that this is the correct way to go about things. But the important thing is that you simply can't create these National Counterterrorism Centers without a strong national intelligence director. Agencies like the CIA and DIA are going to be loath to send their best analysts away, so you need a director who could plausibly enforce that coordination. As it stands now, the NCTC's predecessor -- the Terrorist Threat Integration Center -- has had trouble working with Homeland Security and other domestic intelligence sources, mainly because it reports only to the director of the CIA.
Now, you can argue that no director will be able to coordinate all these various agencies, but in that case you might as well scrap the idea altogether. The real question, then, is why Bush thought it was even possible to have a figurehead national intelligence director in the first place.
- Bradford Plumer
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
This article has been made possible by the Foundation for National Progress, the Investigative Fund of Mother Jones
© 2004 The Foundation for National Progress
posted by BLONDIE at 1:34 PM
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